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Abstract—We study the problem of minimizing the (time)
average security costs in large systems comprising many inter-
dependent subsystems, where the state evolution is captured by
a susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model. The security costs
reflect security investments, economic losses and recovery costs
from infections and failures following successful attacks. We show
that the resulting optimization problem is non-convex and pro-
pose two algorithms – one for solving a convex relaxation, and the
other for finding a local minimizer, based on a reduced gradient
method. Also, we provide a sufficient condition under which the
convex relaxation is exact and its solution coincides with that of
the original problem. Numerical results are provided to validate
our analytical results and to demonstrate the effectiveness of the
proposed algorithms.
Index Terms—Cybersecurity investments; Optimization; SIS
model
I. INTRODUCTION
Complex modern engineering systems, such as information
and communication networks and power systems, consist of
many interdependent systems. In order to deliver their services,
the comprising systems must work together and oftentimes
support each other. Unfortunately, the interdependence makes
it possible for a local failure and infection of a system by
malware to spread to other systems. Similarly, contagious
diseases spread via contacts in social networks. From this
viewpoint, it is clear that any investment in security of the
complex system or the control of disease spread should take
into account the interdependence in the systems and social
contacts in order to achieve the best benefits.
There is already a large volume of literature that examines
how to optimize the (security) investments in complex systems
or the mitigation of disease spread. For example, in [11], [12],
[14], [16], researchers adopted a game theoretic formulation
to study the problem of security investments with distributed
agents. In another line of research, which is more closely
related to our study, researchers investigated optimal strategies
using vaccines/immunization (prevention) [5], [25], antidotes
or curing rates (recovery) [2], [18], [22] or a combination of
both preventive and recovery measures [20], [26].
A key difference between these studies and ours is that,
unlike the previous studies that focus on the exponential decay
rate to disease-free state as a key performance metric, we
are interested in minimizing the (time) average costs of a
system operator. The system costs account for both security
investments and recovery/repair costs ensuing infections or
failures, which we call infection costs, under the assumption
that attacks arrive according to some stochastic process. Se-
curity investments shape the breach probability of comprising
systems, i.e., the probability that the systems fall victim to
attacks and become infected or fail. As attacks do not stop in
our setting, in general it is not possible to achieve infection-
free state at steady state, and the exponential decay rate is no
longer a suitable performance metric.
This difference leads to a non-convex optimization problem
that cannot be solved easily, whereas several of previous
studies led to convex optimization problems, e.g., semidefinite
program in [22], [25] and geometric program in [18], [20],
[26]. To obtain a good solution to our problem, we first
propose a convex relaxation, the optimal value of which
provides a lower bound to that of our problem. We also
derive a sufficient condition for the convex relaxation to be
exact (Corollary 1), in which case the solution of the convex
relaxation solves our problem. In addition, we propose a
reduced gradient-based algorithm (RGA) that produces a local
minimizer. Together, these two approaches offer a bound on
the optimality gap.
Our numerical studies show that when the infection costs
are large, the sufficient condition for the convex relaxation to
be exact holds. Regrettably, solving the convex relaxation does
not scale well with the system size. However, the gap between
the optimal value of convex relaxation and the value achieved
by a local minimizer produced by the RGA tends to be small,
suggesting that we can use the RGA to find a good solution
to our problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
explains the notation and terminology we adopt. Section III
describes the setup and the problem formulation, including the
optimization problem. We describe the proposed algorithms
for finding a lower bound and an upper bound on the optimal
value of the optimization problem in Sections IV and V,
respectively. Section VI present some numerical results.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation and Terminology
We use R and R+ to denote the set of real numbers and
nonnegative real numbers, respectively. For a finite set A, |A|
denotes its cardinality. For a matrix A = [ai,j ], let ai,j denote
its (i, j) element, AT its transpose, ρ(A) its spectral radius,
and σ(A) and σ¯(A) its smallest and largest real parts of its
eigenvalues. For two matrices A andB, we write A ≥ B if A−
B is a nonnegative matrix (i.e., a matrix with all nonnegative
elements). We use boldface letters to denote vectors, e.g., x=
[x1, ..., xn]
T and 1=[1, ..., 1]T. For any two vectors x and y
of the same dimension, x ◦ y and x
y
are their element-wise
product and division, respectively.
A directed graph G = (V , E) consists of a set of nodes V
and a set E ⊆ V × V of directed edges. A directed path is a
sequence of edges in the form
(
(i1, i2), (i2, i3), ..., (ik−1, ik)
)
.
The graph G is strongly connected if there is a directed path
from each node to any other node.
B. M-Matrix Theory
A matrix A = [ai,j ] ∈ R
n×n is an M-matrix if it can be
expressed in the form A = sI −B, where B = [bi,j ] ∈ R
n×n
+
and s ≥ ρ(B). The set of (nonsingular) n× n M-matrices is
denoted by (Mn×n+ ) M
n×n. Note that this definition implies
that the off-diagonal elements of A are nonpositive and the
diagonal elements are nonnegative; any matrix satisfying these
conditions is called a Z-matrix.
We shall make use of the following results on the properties
of a nonsingular M-matrix [24].
Lemma 1. Let A be a Z-matrix. A is a nonsingular M-matrix
if and only if one of the following conditions hold:
(a) A+D is nonsingular for every diagonal D ∈ Rn×n+ .
(b) A is inverse-positive, i.e., ∃A−1 ∈ Rn×n+ .
(c) A is monotone, i.e., Ax ≥ 0⇒ x ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ Rn.
(d) Every regular splitting of A is convergent, i.e., if A =
M −N with M−1, N ∈ Rn×n+ , then ρ(M
−1N) < 1.
(e) A is positive stable, i.e., σ(A) > 0.
(f) ∃x > 0 with Ax ≥ 0 such that if [Ax]i0 = 0, then
∃i1, . . . , ir with aik,ik+1 6= 0 for 0 ≤ k ≤ r − 1 and
[Ax]ir > 0.
(g) ∃x > 0 with Ax > 0.
The next result is a direct consequence of [17, Thm. 2].
Lemma 2. Let A ∈ Mn×n be irreducible. Then
(i) diag(z) +A ∈Mn×n+ for every z ∈ R
n
+ \ {0}.
(ii)
[(
diag(z)+A
)−1]
i,j
is a convex and decreasing function
in z ∈ Rn+ for all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n.
III. MODEL AND FORMULATION
Consider a large system consisting of N (component
or sub-)systems, and denote the set of systems by A :=
{1, 2, . . . , N}. The security of the systems is interdependent
in that the failure or infection of a system can cause that
of other systems. As stated earlier, we study the problem of
determining security investments for hardening or prevention
of each system in order to defend the systems against attacks
in large, complex systems, in which the comprising systems
depend on each other for their function.1 The goal of the
system operator is to minimize the aggregate cost for all
systems (per unit time), which accounts for both security
investments and economic losses from failures/infections of
systems.
1Throughout the paper, we shall use the words ‘failure’ and ‘infection’
interchangeably, in order to indicate that a system fell victim to an attack.
A. Setup
We assume that each system experiences direct attacks
from malicious actors. Direct attacks on system i ∈ A occur
in accordance with a Poisson process with rate λi ∈ R+.
When a system experiences an attack, it suffers a failure
and subsequent economic losses with some probability, called
breach probability.
This breach probability depends on the security investment
on the system: let si ∈ R+ be the security investment on
system i. The breach probability of system i is determined by
some function qi : R+ → (0, 1]. In other words, when the
operator invests si on system i, its breach probability is equal
to qi(si). We assume that qi is decreasing, strictly convex and
continuously differentiable for all i ∈ A.
When system i falls victim to an attack and becomes
infected, the operator incurs costs cri per unit time for recovery
(e.g., inspection and repair of servers). Recovery times are
modeled using independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
exponential random variables with parameter δi > 0. Besides
recovery costs, the failure of system i may cause additional
economic losses if, for example, some servers in system i
have to be taken offline for inspection and repair and are
inaccessible during the period to other systems that depend
on the servers. To model this, we assume that the infection of
system i introduces economic losses of cei per unit time.
Besides the direct attacks, systems also experience indirect
attacks from other failed or infected systems. For example, this
can model the spread of virus/malware or failures in complex
systems. The rate at which the infection of system i causes that
of another system j is denoted by βj,i ∈ R+. When βj,i > 0,
we say that system i supports system j or, equivalently, system
j depends on system i. Let B = [Bi,j ; i, j ∈ A] be an N×N
matrix that describes the infection rates among systems, where
the element Bi,j is equal to βj,i. We adopt the convention
βi,i = 0 for all i ∈ A.
Define a directed graph on G = (A, E), where a directed
edge from system i to system j, denoted by 〈i, j〉, belongs
to the edge set E if and only if βi,j > 0. We denote the
associated adjacency matrix by A, i.e., Ai,j = 1 if βi,j > 0
and Ai,j = 0 otherwise. Throughout the paper, we will assume
that the nonnegative adjacency matrix A (or, equivalently, B)
is irreducible. Note that this is equivalent to assuming that the
graph G is strongly connected.
B. Model
We adopt the susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) model
to capture the evolution of system state. Let pi(t) be the proba-
bility that system i is at the ‘infected’ state (I) at time t ∈ R+.
We approximate the dynamics of p(t) := (pi(t); i ∈ A),
t ∈ R+, using the following differential equations, which are
similar to those employed in [9], [18], [20], [22], [25], [26]:
for fixed security investments, s = (si; i ∈ A) ∈ R
N
+ ,
p˙i(t) = (1− pi(t))qi(si)
(
λi +
∑
j∈A
βj,ipj(t)
)
− δipi(t). (1)
In practice, the breach probability qi can be a complicated
function of the security investment. However, it has been
shown that, under some conditions, the breach probability
function is decreasing and log-convex [1]. Here, in order
to make progress, we assume that the breach probability
functions can be approximated (in the regime of interest) using
a log-convex function of the form qi(s) = (1+ κis)
−1 for all
i ∈ A. The parameter κi > 0 models how quickly the breach
probability decreases with security investment for system i.
Define αi := κiδi, i ∈ A, and α := (αi; i ∈ A). The
following theorem tells us that, for a fixed security investment
vector s := (si; i ∈ A) ∈ R
N
+ , there exists a unique
equilibrium of the differential system given by (1).
Theorem 1. Suppose λ  0, δ > 0 and s ≥ 0 are fixed. If
the network is strongly connected, i.e., B is irreducible, there
exists a unique equilibrium p∗ ∈ (0, 1)N of (1). Moreover,
starting with any p0 satisfying p
∗≤p0≤1, the iteration
pk+1 =
λ+Bpk
λ+Bpk +α ◦ s+ δ
, k ∈ IN, (2)
converges linearly to p∗ with some rate ρ0 < 1−mini∈A p
∗
i .
Proof. Please see Appendix A for a proof.
Note that the unique equilibrium of the differential system
described by (1) specifies the probability that each system will
be infected at steady state. For this reason, we take the average
cost of the system, denoted by Cavg(s), to be
Cavg(s) := w(s) +
∑
i∈A cip
∗
i (s) = w(s) + c
Tp∗(s),
where ci := c
r
i + c
e
i , c = (ci; i ∈ A), and w(s) quantifies
the security investment costs, e.g., w(s) =
∑
i∈A si. In the
remainder of the paper, we assume that w is convex.
Equipped with Theorem 1, we can formulate the problem
of determining optimal security investments that minimize the
average cost Cavg(s) as follows:
(P) min
s,p
f(s,p) := w(s) + cTp (3)
s.t. g(s,p) = 0 (4)
s ∈ RN+ , p ∈ R
N
+
where g(s,p) = (gi(s,p); i ∈ A) and
gi(s,p) = (1− pi)
(
λi +
∑
j∈A
βj,ipj
)
− (αisi + δi)pi, i ∈ A.
Recall that, for given s ∈ RN+ , only the unique equilibrium
p∗ ∈ (0, 1)N in Theorem 1 satisfies the constraint in (4).
This problem (P) is nonconvex due to the nonconvexity
of the equality constraint functions in (4). In particular, gi
contains both quadratic or bilinear terms pipj and pisi. In
the following sections, we develop two algorithms: the first is
based on a convex relaxation and provides a lower bound on
the optimal value of the problem (P). The other is based on
the reduced gradient method and offers an upper bound on the
optimal value. The difference between two bounds gives us a
quantitative measure of optimality gap.
IV. CONVEX RELAXATION AND LOWER BOUNDS
In this section, we describe a convex relaxation of the
problem (P) and provide a sufficient condition for it to be
exact, i.e., its optimal point is also an optimal point of (P).
A. Convex Relaxation
Given λ  0 and irreducible B, Theorem 1 tells us that the
unique equilibrium of (1) which satisfies (4) is strictly positive.
As a result, we can rewrite the constraints in (4) as
(p−1 − 1) ◦ (λ+Bp) = α ◦ s+ δ, (5)
where p−1 = (p−1i ; i ∈ A). By introducing a new variable
z := p−1 ◦ (λ+Bp), (6)
the constraint in (5) can be rewritten as
z = α ◦ s + δ + λ+Bp. (7)
Note that (7) is affine in z, s and p, and the non-convexity in
the equality constraint functions (mentioned at the end of the
previous section) is now captured by z, which can be expressed
as
(diag(z) −B)p = λ  0. (8)
Since B is irreducible, Lemma 1-(f) tells us that the constraints
in (8) and p > 0 imply that (diag(z) − B) is a nonsingular
M-matrix and p = (diag(z)−B)−1λ. As a result, the original
problem can be reformulated as
(P2) min
s,p,z
f(s,p)
s.t. p = (diag(z)−B)−1λ
z = α ◦ s+ δ + λ+Bp
s ∈ RN+ , p ∈ R
N
+ , z ∈ Ω
where
Ω :=
{
z ∈ RN+ | diag(z)−B ∈M
N×N
+
}
(9)
We can show that the set Ω in (9) is convex. This approved
in Appendix B. Moreover, it follows from Lemma 2 that for
any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ N , the element
[(
diag(z)−B
)−1]
i,j
is convex
and (element-wise) decreasing in z ∈ Ω. For these reasons, we
obtain the following convex relaxation of (P2):
(PR) min
s,p,z
f(s,p) (10)
s.t. p ≥ (diag(z)− B)−1λ (11)
z = α ◦ s+ δ + λ +Bp (12)
s ∈ RN+ , p ≤ 1, z ∈ Ω
This convex relaxation can be solved by numerical convex
solvers to provide a lower bound on the optimal value of (P).
Theorem 2. Let x∗R := (s
∗
R,p
∗
R, z
∗
R) denote an optimal point
of (PR) and f
∗ the optimal value of (P). Then, we have
f(s∗R,p
∗
R) ≤ f
∗ ≤ f(s˜(x∗R), p˜(x
∗
R)),
where (s˜(x∗R), p˜(x
∗
R)) is a feasible solution for problem (P)
given by p˜(x∗R) = (diag(z
∗
R) − B)
−1
λ and s˜(x∗R) = s
∗
R +
diag(α−1)B(p∗R − p˜(x
∗
R)).
Proof. The first inequality is obvious because (PR) is a
convex relaxation of (P). For the second inequality, note that
(s˜(x∗R), p˜(x
∗
R), z
∗
R) is a feasible point for (PR). Moreover,
it satisfies (11) with equality. Thus, it is a feasible point for
problem (P), proving the second inequality.
Clearly, x∗R solves (P) if the inequality constraints in
(11) are all active at x∗R, which means f(s
∗
R,p
∗
R) =
f(s˜(x∗R), p˜(x
∗
R)). Based on this, we can provide a following
sufficient condition for the convex relaxation (PR) to be exact.
Corollary 1. Let (s˜, p˜) = (s˜(x∗R), p˜(x
∗
R)) be given as in
Theorem 2. The above convex relaxation (PR) is exact if
∇w(s˜)Tdiag(α−1)B ≤ cT. (13)
Proof. Note that since w is convex, we have w(s˜)−w(s∗R) ≤
∇w(s˜)T(s˜ − s∗R) = ∇w(s˜)
Tdiag(α−1)B(p∗R − p˜). Using
this and the fact that p∗R ≥ p˜, we have the gap f(s˜, p˜) −
f(s∗R,p
∗
R) = (∇w(s˜)
Tdiag(α−1)B − cT)(p∗R − p˜) ≤ 0,
provided that condition (13) holds. In this case, by Theorem 2,
this gap must be zero, i.e., the convex relaxation is exact.
Roughly speaking, the condition in (13) means that when
the infection costs c are high, the convex relaxation (PR) is
exact and we can find globally optimal security investments,
i.e., a solution to (P), by solving the convex relaxation instead.
Remark 1. Although (PR) is a minimization problem of a
convex objective function over a convex set, there are a few
obstacles to solving it numerically. First, the Jacobian of
constraint functions in (11), which involves the derivative of
inverse matrix (diag(z)−B)−1, tends to be dense even when
B is sparse. As a result, off-the-shelf convex solvers may not
be suitable for large systems.
Second, although the constraint set Ω for z (defined in (9))
is convex, it does not have a closed-form expression and is
not numerically easy to handle, especially for large networks.
This is because Ω is not closed and the relaxed problem
becomes invalid outside Ω. Thus, numerical algorithms should
stay inside Ω and, for this reason, the nonsingularity of the
M-matrix, diag(z) − B, should be ensured at every step. In
general, it takes O(N3) to check if the matrix satisfies this
condition [23]. The following approach can, however, help
reduce the computational burden.
s1 Starting at some z0 ∈ Ω, solve (PR) only with the
constraint z ∈ RN+ . Then, check if the obtained solution
x∗R satisfies z
∗
R ∈ Ω, If so, x
∗
R solves (PR). Otherwise,
go to step s2.
s2 Choose a simpler subset Ω˜ ⊂ Ω and solve (PR) subject
to a new constraint z ∈ Ω˜. If z∗R in x
∗
R lies in int Ω˜, the
solution is optimal for (PR). If z
∗
R lies on ∂Ω˜, construct
a new Ω˜ so that z∗R belongs to the interior of new Ω˜ and
repeat. In the next subsection, we propose an efficient
way of choosing the subset Ω˜ that is more suitable for
numerical algorithms.
B. Construction of Convex Subsets of Ω
A key observation to constructing a sequence of suitable
subsets of Ω is that, in view of Lemmas 1 and 2, Ω can be
expressed as
Ω =
⋃
z∈∂Ω
{z ∈ Rn+ | z  z},
where ∂Ω denotes the boundary of Ω. Thus, for every z ∈
∂Ω, Ω˜(z) := {z ∈ Rn+ | z  z} ⊂ Ω. Our goal is to find
some zˇ ∈ ∂Ω such that an optimal point x∗R that solves the
relaxed problem with Ω replaced by Ω˜(zˇ), satisfies z∗R ∈ int
Ω˜(zˇ). Below, we provide several possible choices for z with
increasing computational complexity.
1) Diagonal dominance: The matrix diag(z) − B is non-
singular if it is strictly diagonally dominant. This can be
guaranteed by choosing z > B1, where the lower bound B1
represents the total rate of infection from immediate neighbors
in the graph G. From (12), a trivial sufficient condition is
δ + λ ≥ B1. In general, however, we observed empirically
that this often leads to suboptimal solutions.
2) Dominant eigenvalue: Another straightforward lower
bound is given by z > ρ(B)1. Recall that the spectral radius
ρ(B) is also an eigenvalue of B and equal to σ¯(B), which can
be computed efficiently using, for example, the power method.
3) Iterative dominant eigenvalue selection via matrix bal-
ancing: Unfortunately, we observe empirically that a static
selection of the subset Ω˜ does not always lead to a good
solution and an iterative algorithm described below yields
better performance.
Let h > 0 be a normal vector of the plane tangent to the
closure of Ω, denoted by Ω¯, at some z ∈ ∂Ω such that
z = argminz∈Rn+ {h
Tz | z ∈ Ω¯}
= argminz∈Rn+ {h
Tz | σ
(
diag(z) −B
)
= 0}, (14)
where the second equality follows from the fact that we are
minimizing a linear function over a closed convex set. The
minimization in (14) amounts to finding the smallest diagonal
perturbation z (in 1-norm weighted by h) so that B becomes
(negative) stable. We show in Appendix C that this is in fact a
matrix balancing problem, for which efficient algorithms exist
(see [3], [21] for nearly-linear time centralized algorithms and
[18], [19] for distributed algorithms with geometric conver-
gence).
Our proposed algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. Ini-
tially, we choose some h¯ > 1 and h = α−1 ◦ ∇w(s0),
where s0 is the initial choice for security investments. This
heuristic is based on the relaxed problem by weighting only
the investment cost w(s) without considering p. Subsequent
iterations are based on dominant eigenvalue with time-varying
weights determined by h+ that reflects active constraints of
z˜R (of the current solution). Moreover, since z˜R ∈ Ω, we have
σ
(
diag(z˜R) − B
)
> 0. Thus, we can construct a new subset
Ω˜(z) by translating the set {z ≥ z˜R} towards the boundary
∂Ω along the direction of h+, so that z˜R lies in the interior
of new Ω˜(z). In our numerical studies, we use h¯ = 10.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Convex Relaxation (PR)
1 init: t = 0, h¯ > 1, z(0) from (14)
2 while stopping cond. not met do
3 (s˜
(t+1)
R , p˜
(t+1)
R , z˜
(t+1)
R )← solve (PR)with z∈Ω˜(z
(t))
4 Iac ← {i ∈ A | [z˜
(t+1)
R ]i = [z
(t)]i}
5 if Iac = ∅ then
6 stop
7 h+ ← (h+i = 1, i /∈ Iac;h
+
i = h¯, i ∈ Iac)
8 d← σ
(
diag(h+)−1(diag(z˜
(t+1)
R )−B)
)
9 z(t+1) ← z˜
(t+1)
R − dh
+
10 t← t+ 1
V. UPPER BOUND VIA A REDUCED GRADIENT METHOD
Although the convex relaxation (PR) may be exact under
certain conditions, this is not true in general, in which case it
only provides a lower bound on the optimal value of (P). In
addition, it may not scale well due to the constraint in (11);
see also Remark 1 above and numerical results in Section VI.
For these reasons, we also propose an efficient algorithm for
finding a local minimizer of the non-convex problem (P). This
provides an upper bound on the optimal value, which, together
with the optimal value of the convex relaxation when available,
can be used to offer a bound on the optimality gap.
Among different non-convex optimization approaches, we
choose the reduced gradient method [8], [15] because it is well
suited to the problem (P) and, more importantly, is scalable.
Moreover, local convergence of the proposed algorithm can be
established with the help of known convergence results of the
generalized reduced gradient method (e.g., [8], [15]).
A. Main Algorithm
First, together with Theorem 1, the implicit function the-
orem tells us that the condition g(s,p) = 0 in (4) defines
a continuous mapping p∗ : s ∈ RN+ 7→ p
∗(s) ∈ (0, 1)N
such that g(s,p∗(s)) = 0. Thus, the problem (P) can be
transformed to a reduced problem only with optimization
variables s:
min
s∈RN+
F (s) := w(s) + cTp∗(s) (15)
Suppose that (s⋆,p⋆) is a feasible point of (P). Then, the
gradient of F at s⋆ is equal to
∇F (s⋆) = ∇w(s⋆) + J(s⋆)Tc,
where the Jacobian matrix J(s⋆) is given by J(s⋆) =[
∂p∗i (s
⋆)/∂sj
]
. This matrix can be computed by totally dif-
ferentiating g(s,p(s)) = 0 at s⋆: the calculation of total
derivative yields
M(s⋆)J(s⋆) = −diag(α ◦ p⋆) (16)
with M(s⋆) = diag(α ◦ s⋆+ δ+λ+Bp⋆)−diag(1−p⋆)B.
The following lemma shows that M(s⋆) is nonsingular.
Lemma 3. The matrix M(s⋆) is a nonsingular M-matrix.
Proof. First, note M(s⋆) is a Z-matrix. Second, after some
algebra, the constraint g(s⋆,p⋆) = 0 is equivalent to
M(s⋆)p⋆ = λ+ p⋆ ◦ (Bp⋆)
Since p⋆ > 0, we have λ+p⋆ ◦ (Bp⋆) > 0. Thus, Lemma 1-
(g) implies that M(s⋆) is a nonsingular M-matrix.
As M(s⋆) is nonsingular, J(s⋆) = −M(s⋆)−1diag(α ◦p⋆)
from (16) and the gradient of F is given by
∇F (s⋆) = ∇w(s⋆)−α ◦ p⋆ ◦
((
M(s⋆)
)−T
c
)
Hence, we can now apply the gradient descent algorithm on
the reduced problem with step sizes {γt}t≥0, for example,
using the Armijo backtracking line search scheme.
Note that, after each update of s during a search, we need
to compute the corresponding p so that (s,p) is feasible for
the problem (P). As mentioned earlier, this can be done by
using the fixed point iteration in (2). Our proposed algorithm
is provided in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: Reduced Gradient Method
1 init: t = 0, feasible (s(0),p(0))
2 while stopping cond. not met do
3 M (t)=diag(1−p(t))B−diag(α◦s(t)+δ+λ+Bp(t))
4 u = (M (t))−Tc
5 γt ← LINE SEARCH
6 s(t+1)=
[
s(t) − γt
(
∇w(s(t))−α ◦ p(t) ◦ u
)]
+
7 p(t+1) = p(s(t+1)) using (2)
8 t = t+ 1
There are several possible stopping conditions one can
employ, including the following:
sc1. A maximum number of iterations is reached: t = Tmax
sc2. The change in solution is small:
‖s(t+1)−s(t)‖
‖s(t)‖
≤ ǫ
B. Computational Complexity and Issues
For large systems, a naive evaluation of the gradient ∇F ,
which requires the inverse matrix
(
M(s⋆)
)−T
, becomes com-
putationally expensive, if not infeasible. For this reason, we
develop an efficient subroutine for computing ∇F . This is
possible because our algorithm only requires u (in line 4 of
Algorithm 2), not
(
M(s⋆)
)−T
.
For fixed t ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, the vector u is a solution to a set of
linear equations MTu = c, where the matrix MT tends to be
sparse for most real graphs G. Thus, there are many efficient
algorithms for solving them. In this paper, we employ the
power method: let M = D − E, where D and E denote the
diagonal part and off-diagonal parts of M , respectively. Then,
the linear equations are equivalent to c = Du − ETu. Since
D is invertible, the following fixed point relation holds:
u = D−1ETu+D−1c =: G(u) (17)
As M ∈ MN×N+ (Lemma 3), Lemma1-(d) tells us that
M = D − E is a convergent splitting and the mapping G in
(17) is a contraction mapping with coefficient ρ(D−1ET) < 1.
Hence, the iteration uk+1 = G(uk) converges to the solu-
tion u exponentially fast. Moreover, this iteration is highly
scalable; first, E = diag(1 − p)B is sparse (requiring only
O(|E|) memory space). Second, the computation also takes
O(|E|) operations. Thus, if we terminate after ku iterations
(with convergence error proportional to
(
ρ(D−1ET)
)ku
), the
running time to compute u is O(ku|E|).
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we provide some numerical results that
demonstrate the performance of the proposed algorithms. Our
numerical studies are carried out in MATLAB on a laptop with
8GB RAM and a single Intel Core i5 processor with clock
speed of 2.4GHz.2 We consider 5 different strongly connected
scale-free networks with (n, |E|) = (100, 474), (200, 1014),
(500, 2738), (1000, 5750), and (1500, 8850). The power law
parameter for node degrees is set to ξ = 1.5, and the minimum
and maximum node degrees are equal to 2 and ⌈3 logn⌉,
respectively.
For all considered networks, we pick αi = 1 and δi =
0.1. The direct attack rates λi, i ∈ A, and infection rates
βj,i, 〈j, i〉 ∈ E , are modeled using i.i.d. Uniform(0,1) random
variables. We choose
w(s) = 1Ts and c = νBT1+ 2crand, ν ∈ {0, 0.5, 1},
where the elements of crand are given by i.i.d. Uniform(0,1)
random variables. We consider c above, in order to reflect an
observation that nodes which support more neighbors should,
on the average, have larger economic costs modeled by cei
(Section III-A).
In line 3 of Algorithm 1 for solving (PR) with Ω replaced
by Ω˜(z(t)), we use the interior point method from package [6]
with relative convergence tolerance set to 10−6 and Hessian
matrices approximated by a quasi-Newton algorithm. The
initial point x˜
(0)
R = (s˜
(0)
R , p˜
(0)
R , z˜
(0)
R ) is chosen to be s˜
(0)
R = 0,
p˜
(0)
R = p
∗(0) using the iteration in (2), and z˜
(0)
R = λ + δ +
Bp˜
(0)
R according to (7). When computing p˜
(0)
R , the iteration
in (2) is run until ||pk+1 − pk|| / ||pk|| ≤ 10
−8. In addition,
we approximate the set of active constraints of z˜R (line 4 of
Algorithm 1) using Iac = {i ∈ A | [z˜R]i− [z]i ≤ 10
−3}, and
select h¯ = 10.
For Algorithm 2, we select (s(0),p(0)) = (0,p∗(0)) as a
feasible initial point3 and stop the algorithm whenever
‖s(t+1) − s(t)‖
‖s(t)‖
≤ 10−6 or
|F (s(t+1))− F (s(t))|
F (s(t))
≤ 10−10.
2Mention of commercial products does not imply NIST’s endorsement.
3If (s˜, p˜) = (s˜(x∗
R
), p˜(x∗
R
)) given in Theorem 2 is available, it can be
used an initial point. Here, we choose (0,p∗(0)) for numerical comparisons.
TABLE I
NUMERICAL RESULTS FOR SCALE-FREE NETWORKS.
ν = 0 Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
n |f˜ − f∗
R
|/f∗
R
iter seq ts (s) |f − f∗R|/f
∗
R
iter k¯u k¯p ts (s)
100 1.34× 10−1 20/18 0.26 1.35× 10−2 56 9 7 0.02
200 1.28× 10−1 19/17/14 1.37 1.45× 10−2 34 9 7 0.02
500 1.29× 10−1 25/25/30 21.2 1.42× 10−2 48 7 6 0.05
1000 1.30× 10−1 29/24/23 150 1.30× 10−2 36 13 11 0.12
1500 1.57× 10−1 24/22/19 438 1.40× 10−2 56 9 7 0.34
ν=0.5 Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
n |f˜ − f∗
R
|/f∗
R
iter seq ts (s) |f − f∗R|/f
∗
R
iter k¯u k¯p ts (s)
100 1.66× 10−2 21/17 0.24 3.11 × 10−3 75 9 7 0.02
200 1.28× 10−2 20/20/16 1.52 2.64 × 10−3 71 9 7 0.03
500 1.25× 10−2 24/22 13.1 2.02 × 10−3 75 11 8 0.09
1000 1.20× 10−2 27/21/15 126 1.96 × 10−3 71 12 9 0.25
1500 1.38× 10−2 38/23/23 556 2.05 × 10−3 77 13 11 0.47
ν=1 Algorithm 1 Algorithm 2
n |f˜ − f∗
R
|/f∗
R
iter seq ts (s) |f − f∗R|/f
∗
R
iter k¯u k¯p ts (s)
100 3.54× 10−9 22 0.14 2.11× 10−8 169 18 12 0.05
200 2.71× 10−9 29 0.78 2.34× 10−8 177 15 10 0.10
500 1.83× 10−9 27/12 10.7 2.37× 10−8 209 16 11 0.33
1000 2.84× 10−9 31 66 1.58× 10−8 247 15 11 0.70
1500 6.01× 10−9 40 259 1.30× 10−8 220 16 12 1.30
We compute u in line 4 using the fixed point iteration in
(17) and p∗(s(t+1)) in line 7 using the iteration in (2), with
stopping conditions
‖uk+1 − uk‖
‖uk‖
≤ 10−8 and
‖pk+1 − pk‖
‖pk‖
≤ 10−8.
We employ the backtracking line search algorithm with γ0 =
0.5, a shrinking factor of 0.85, and the Armijo condition
parameter set to 10−4.
Our numerical results are summarized in Table I. For
Algorithm 1, we report the relative gap |f˜ − f∗R|/f
∗
R, where f
∗
R
denotes the optimal value of (PR) and f˜ := f(s˜(x
∗
R), p˜(x
∗
R)).
There are two observations from our numerical studies: (i) As
ν increases and infection costs become larger, as expected
from Corollary 1, the gap diminishes and becomes negligible
when ν = 1. (ii) We also report in the column iter seq the
sequence of inner interior-point iterations. The number of outer
iterations is relatively small (at most 3 in all cases as shown
in the table). However, as expected, the runtime (in seconds)
denoted by ts does not scale well with the network size. For
example, for a large network with (n, |E|) = (2000, 12076),
the interior-point method failed to converge within an hour.
For Algorithm 2, we report a similar relative gap
|f − f∗R|/f
∗
R, where f := f(s
⋆,p⋆) and (s⋆,p⋆) is the
solution found by Algorithm 2. It is worth noting that the
upper bound f is very close to the lower bound f∗R, even when
the relaxation may not be exact (for ν = 0, 0.5). In addition, it
achieves optimal solutions when the relaxation is exact. This
suggests that the algorithm can practically find global solutions
to the original problem.
We also report the maximum number of fixed point iter-
ations needed for evaluating u in line 4 and p∗ in line 7,
denoted by k¯u and k¯p, respectively. In our studies, k¯u and k¯p
are all relatively small as expected from our earlier discussions
(Theorem 1 and Section V-B). Finally, Algorithm 2 is highly
scalable: in spite of a larger number of required iterations
compared to Algorithm 1, the total runtime ts is much smaller
and is a fraction of that of Algorithm 1.4
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium can be
established following the same approach in [13], and we omit
its proof here.
We now show that p∗ can be obtained using the iteration
in (2) of the theorem. Given λ  0, δ, s ≥ 0, it follows that
the steady state p∗ satisfying (5),
(1− p∗) ◦ (λ +Bp∗) = u ◦ p∗ (18)
with u = α ◦ s+ δ. This is equivalent to
p∗ =
λ+Bp∗
λ+Bp∗ + u
=: F (p∗). (19)
Throughout this section, the multiplication, division and square
operations of two vectors are element-wise. This show that p∗
is a fixed point of the map F . It can be verified that F satisfies
the following properties of a standard interference function
[28]: for any p ≥ p′ ≥ 0 (i) F (p) > 0, (ii) F (p) ≥ F (p′),
and (iii) cF (p) > F (cp) for c > 1. As a result, the unique
fixed point of F can be computed using the iteration
pk+1 = F (pk) (20)
starting from any p0 ≥ 0. The convergence of the synchronous
version (as well as asynchronous one) can be found in, e.g.,
[28]. However, little is known about the convergence rate ex-
cept when a stronger condition than (iii) is used; for example,
a linear convergence is achieved when F is a contraction
[7]. Here, we demonstrate a linear convergence rate using a
different, more direct argument.
First, for any p ≥ p′ ≥ p∗, we have
0 ≤ F (p)− F (p′) =
u ◦B(p− p′)
(u+ λ+Bp) ◦ (u+ λ+Bp′)
≤
u ◦B(p− p′)
(u+ λ+Bp∗)2
=
(1− p∗)2
u
◦B(p− p′)
= diag(1− p∗)ΞB(p − p′)
where Ξ = diag(1−p
∗
u
), and the second equality is a conse-
quence of 1− p∗ = u
u+λ+Bp∗ obtained from (18) and (19).
Next, we show that ρ(ΞB) ≤ 1, which then implies
ρ
(
diag(1− p∗)ΞB
)
≤ 1−mini p
∗
i < 1. (21)
4We note that we did not optimize step sizes; we instead used the same
parameters in all cases.
To this end, note ρ(ΞB) ≤ ρ
(
Ξ
(
diag( λ
p∗
) + B
))
= 1 since
Ξ(λ + Bp∗) = p∗ from (18). Thus, we conclude that F is
contractive with parameter ρ0 := ρ
(
diag(1 − p∗)ΞB
)
< 1.
In fact, starting from any p0 such that p
∗ ≤ p0 ≤ 1,
iteration (20) satisfies 0 ≤ pk−p
∗ ≤ ρk0(p0−p
∗), i.e., linear
convergence rate is achieved.
APPENDIX B
CONVEXITY OF Ω
We will prove this convexity claim by using the convexity of
the dominant eigenvalue of an essentially nonnegative matrix
(also known as a Metzler matrix, i.e., off-diagonal elements
are nonnegative). In particular, it is known that any Metzler
matrix A ∈ Rn×n has an eigenvalue σ¯(A) called the dominant
eigenvalue that is real and greater than or equal to the real part
of any other eigenvalue ofA. Moreover, we have the following.
Lemma 1. [4] Let A be a Metzler matrix andD be a diagonal
matrix. Then σ¯(A+D) is a convex function of D.
Thus, we conclude that σ(diag(z)−B) is concave in z.
Now, fix any z1, z2 ∈ Ω and let us show that z(τ) :=
τz1 + (1 − τ)z2 ∈ Ω for any τ ∈ [0, 1], which proves the
convexity of Ω. To see this, note that since B is a Metzler
matrix, we have the following equivalence (cf. Lemma 1-(e)):
z ∈ Ω ⇔ σ(diag(z) −B) > 0
Thus, we have σ(diag(zi) − B) > 0, i = 1, 2. This, to-
gether with the concavity of σ(diag(z) − B), implies that
σ(diag(z(τ))−B) ≥ τσ(diag(z1)−B)+(1−τ)σ(diag(z2)−
B) > 0 for any τ ∈ [0, 1].
APPENDIX C
EQUIVALENCE OF (14) AND MATRIX BALANCING
First, recall that a matrix A ∈ Rn×n+ is balanced if A1 =
AT1. A positive diagonal matrix X is said to balance a matrix
A ∈ Rn×n+ if XAX
−1 is balanced. The following lemma
holds [27]:
Lemma 2. For any A ∈ Rn×n+ , let GA denote the weighted
directed graph associated with A. Then, the following state-
ments are equivalent:
(i) A positive diagonal matrix X that balances A exists.
(ii) The graph GA is strongly connected.
(iii) There exists a positive vector x that minimizes the sum∑
1≤i,j≤n aijxix
−1
j .
Moreover, matrix X and vector x are unique up to scalars.
We now proceed to prove that (14) is a matrix balanc-
ing problem. Suppose that σ(diag(z) − B) = 0, which is
equivalent to the condition that diag(z) − B is a singular
M-matrix (i.e., z ∈ ∂Ω). Then, there exists B˜ ∈ Rn×n+
such that diag(z) − B = ρ(B˜)I − B˜. Since B˜ is also
irreducible, it then follows from the Perron-Frobenius theorem
[10] that there is x > 0 such that B˜x = ρ(B˜)x. As a result,
(diag(z) −B)x = 0, i.e.,
∑n
j=1 bijxjx
−1
i = zi, ∀i = 1, . . . , n. (22)
Therefore, we can write (14) as follows.
minz>0 {h
Tz | σ
(
diag(z) −B
)
= 0}
=minz>0,x>0 {h
Tz | (22) holds}
=minx>0
∑
1≤i,j≤n hibijxjx
−1
i
which, by Lemma 2, is the problem of balancing diag(h)B.
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